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Abstract
The classical coupon collector problem is closely related to probabilistic-packet-marking (PPM) schemes for IP traceback problem
in the Internet. In this paper, we study the classical coupon collector problem, and derive some upper and lower bounds of the
complementary cumulative distribution function (ccdf) of the number of objects (coupons) that one has to check in order to detect
a set of different objects. The derived bounds require much less computation than the exact formula. We numerically ﬁnd that the
proposed bounds are very close to the actual ccdf when detecting probabilities are set to the values common to the PPM schemes.
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1. Introduction
Consider a box which contains N types of numerous objects.An object in the box is repeatedly sampled on a random
basis. Let pi (> 0) denote the probability that a type-i object is sampled. The successive samplings are statistically
independent and the sampling probabilities, p1, p2, . . . , pN , are ﬁxed. When a type-i object is sampled for the ﬁrst
time, we say that a type-i object is detected. To ﬁnd the number of samplings required for detecting a set of object types
(say, object types indexed by i = 1, . . . , n) is traditionally called coupon collector problem.
The study of the coupon collector problem has a long history and can be found in many texts, see e.g., Feller [2].
The coupon-collector problem has been found to be a useful mathematical model for a variety of natural phenomena
and engineering applications. A concise explanation about typical applications of the coupon collector problem was
found in [7]. Concerning recent studies on the coupon collector problem, please see [1,7,4,6].
To explain our motivation of this study, let us explain an application of the coupon collector problem to the ﬁeld
of telecommunication. It is widely recognized that the denial-of-service (DoS) attack is one of the hardest security
problems in the Internet. Identifying aDoS attacker is usually called the IP traceback problem. Savage et al. [8] proposed
a promising solution, called probabilistic packet marking (PPM), to the IP traceback problem.Their solution is to simply
let routers probabilistically mark packets with partial information of an attack path during packet forwarding.Although
each packet represents only partial information of the attack path, a victim can construct the entire path by combining
the information conveyed by a modest number of marked packets.
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In a PPM scheme, the number of packets that the victim should receive to reconstruct the attack path is equivalent to
the number of samplings required for detecting a set of object types in the coupon collector problem. (In what follows,
we referred to the number of samplings required for detecting a set of object types as detecting cost.) Thus, analyzing
the efﬁciency of the PPM scheme comes down to solving the coupon collector problem. In particular, the false negative
ratio of a PPM scheme is given by the complementary cumulative distribution function (ccdf) of the detecting cost (see
Section 4). Thus, it is crucial to compute the ccdf of the detecting cost for evaluating the efﬁciency of PPM schemes.As
shown in Section 2, however, the ccdf of the detecting cost is not easy to compute exactly because of its cumbersome
combinatorial formula.
The aim of this paper is to ﬁnd some techniques to calculate the ccdf of the detecting cost with small computational
time and with accuracy sufﬁcient for practical use. To this end, in this paper, we derive some upper and lower bounds
of the ccdf of the detecting cost. The derived bounds are much more suited to numerical computation than the exact
formula. In addition to this, we ﬁnd that these bounds are very close to the actual ccdf when sampling probability is
set to the values typical to the PPM schemes.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy summarize some fundamental formulas of
the coupon collector problem. In Section 3, we derive the upper and lower bounds of the complementary cumulative
distribution function (ccdf) of the detecting cost. In Section 4, we explain how the ccdf of the detecting cost is related
to the attacking-path-detection efﬁciency of PPM schemes, and show the results of some numerical experiments to
conform the tightness of the bounds.
2. Some fundamental formulas of coupon collector problem
In this section, we summarize some fundamental formulas of the coupon collector problem. Let Xi be the number
of samplings required for detecting a type-i object and deﬁne
X
def= max{X1, . . . , Xn}, nN .
Note that X corresponds to the detecting cost for object types indexed by i = 1, . . . , n.
Let J denote a subset of set {1, 2, . . . , n}, and |J | denote cardinality of J. Furthermore, we let
PJ
def=
∑
j∈J
pj .
Although some representation of the distribution function of X seems to be available in some literatures, we here give
a representation of the ccdf of X with its proof for completeness of the paper.
Lemma 1.
P [X>k] =
n∑
i=1
(−1)i+1
∑
J ;|J |=i
(1 − PJ )k . (1)
Proof. Let A(k)j denote the event that all of k sampled objects are not type j. Now deﬁne
S
(k)
J
def=
⋂
j∈J
A
(k)
j .
By the inclusion–exclusion principle [2],
P
⎡
⎣ n⋃
j=1
A
(k)
j
⎤
⎦= n∑
j=1
(−1)j−1
∑
J ;|J |=j
P [S(k)J ].
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Since P [S(k)J ] = (1 − PJ )k , it follows that,
P [X>k] = P
⎡
⎣ n⋃
j=1
A
(k)
j
⎤
⎦
=
n∑
j=1
(−1)j−1
∑
J ;|J |=j
P [S(k)J ]
=
n∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
∑
J ;|J |=j
(1 − PJ )k ,
which completes the proof.
In particular, if p1 = · · · = pn = p, then we have a simpler representation such as
P [X>k] =
n∑
i=1
(−1)i+1
(n
i
)
(1 − ip)k . (2)
From representation (1), the expectation and the generating function of X are readily obtained
E[X] =
n∑
i=1
(−1)i+1
∑
J ;|J |=i
1
PJ
, (3)
g(z) =
∞∑
k=1
zkP [X = k] =
n∑
i=0
(−1)i
∑
J ;|J |=i
1 − z
1 − z + zP J . (4)
The above representation of the expectation of X is not suitable for numerical evaluation because of a combinatorial
explosion. For example, the number of summing-up operations required for computing (3) exponentially increases with
n because
n∑
i=1
∑
J ;|J |=i
1 =
n∑
i=1
(n
i
)
= 2n − 1.
To alleviate the problem, in [3] the following compact integral representation of the expectation of X was derived
E[X] =
∫ ∞
0
(
1 −
n∏
i=1
(1 − e−pi t )
)
dt .
Similarly, we can have the following compact integral representation of the generating function of X.
g(z) = 1 + (z − 1)
∫ ∞
0
e−(1−z)t
(
1 −
n∏
i=1
(1 − e−zpi t )
)
dt .
3. Upper and lower bound of coupon collector problem
In some engineering applications, it is important to compute the ccdf of X. The exact formula of the ccdf of X
(formula (1)) is computationally expensive as explained in Section 2. To alleviate this difﬁculty, we focus on deriving
some bounds of the ccdf of X, which are easy to compute even if the number of object types is quite large.
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3.1. Lower bound
Since the stochastic property of X strongly depends on sampling probability p= (p1, p2, . . . , pn), in what follows,
we use notation X(p) to remind us of this dependence. We deﬁne
peven(p)
def= (pave, . . . , pave), pave def= 1
n
n∑
i=1
pi .
For later use, we here introduce the following deﬁnitions:
Deﬁnition 2. Vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) is said to majorize vector q = (q1, . . . , qn) if
k∑
i=1
q(i)
k∑
i=1
p(i), k = 1, . . . , n − 1,
n∑
i=1
q(i) =
n∑
i=1
p(i),
where  and  are permutations of the indices 1, . . . , n that reorder p and q in ascending order, that is
p(1)p(2) · · · p(n), q(1)q(2) · · · q(n).
We write q ≺ p when p majorize q.
Deﬁnition 3. A real valued function f deﬁned on Rn is said to be Schur-convex (concave) if
q ≺ p ⇒ f (q)()f (p).
Deﬁnition 4. Let X1 and X2 be random variables in R. Then X1 is said to be stochastically larger than X2 if
P [X2 >x]P [X1 >x] for all x
We write X2 stX1 when X1 is stochastically larger than X2.
Although the next lemma is suggested in [4] without proof, we give its proof in appendix for completeness of
the paper.
Lemma 5. The ccdf of X is a Schur-concave function of the sampling probability.
Proof. Please see Appendix A.
The following result readily follows from Lemma 5.
Lemma 6. For all sampling probabilities p
X(peven(p)) stX(p).
Proof. Since p ≺ peven(p), it follows from Lemma 5 that
P [X(peven(p))> x]P [X(p)> x] for all x,
which completes the proof.
Lemma 6 with (2) gives a lower bound of the ccdf of X such as
P [X>k]P [X(peven(p))> k] =
n∑
i=1
(−1)i+1
(n
i
)
(1 − ipave)k . (5)
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The number of summing-up operations required for computing (5) is the second order of n, and thus it can be easily
computed even when n is quite large.
We can have another lower bound of X(p) by a simple probabilistic argument.
Lemma 7. The following inequality holds:
P [X(p)> k]
2∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
∑
J :|J |=j
(1 − PJ )k
=
n∑
j=1
(1 − pj )k −
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
(1 − pi − pj )k (6)
Proof. See Appendix B.
We numerically show the tightness of lower bounds (5) and (6) in Section 4.
Remark 8. Inequality (6) has a simple physical interpretation. The ﬁrst term of the right-hand side (RHS) of (6) is
the contribution by events that all object types except one have been detected until when k objects are sampled. The
second term of the RHS of (6) is the correction by events that all object types except two have been detected. Inequality
(6) can be further improved by taking account of the contribution by events that more than two object types have not
been detected until when k objects are sampled, but the contribution of these events is expected to be negligible when
k is quite large. In fact, we have conﬁrmed through numerical examples that (6) gives very tight bounds in the tail
of the cumulative distribution function of X. We note that (6) can be generalized to the following inequality (please
see Appendix B):
P [X(p)> k]
2l∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
∑
J :|J |=j
(1 − PJ )k for l = 1, 2, . . . . (7)
3.2. Upper bound
Like lower bounds, we can have two different upper bounds of X. The ﬁrst one is derived by using stochastic
comparison. To show this, we ﬁrst deﬁne
pmin
def= (pmin, . . . , pmin).
Deﬁnition 9. A real valued function f deﬁned on Rn is said to be increasing (decreasing) if
qp ⇒ f (q)()f (p),
where qp means p is larger than q in a coordinate-wise sense.
We have the following intuitive result.
Lemma 10. The ccdf of X is a decreasing function of the sampling probability.
Proof. Please see Appendix C.
The following result readily follows from Lemma 10.
Lemma 11. X(p) stX(pmin).
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Proof. Since pminp coordinatewise, it follows from Lemma 10 that
P [X(p)> x]P [X(pmin)> x] for all x,
which complete the proof.
Lemma 11 with (2) gives the following upper bound of the ccdf of X.
P [X>k]P [X(pmin)> k] =
n∑
i=1
(−1)i+1
(n
i
)
(1 − ipmin)k . (8)
We also have another upper bound by a simple probabilistic argument.
Lemma 12. The following inequality holds:
P [X(p)> k]
∑
J :|J |=1
(1 − PJ )k =
n∑
i=1
(1 − pi)k . (9)
Proof. Please see Appendix D.
We also numerically show the tightness of lower bounds (8) and (9) in Section 4.
Remark 13. The difference between the lower bound by (6) and the upper bound by (9) asymptotically becomes
negligible compared with P [X>k] as k → ∞. To see this, observe that
RHS of (9) − RHS of (6)
P [X>k] 
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=i+1(1 − pi − pj )k∑n
i=1 (1 − pi)k −
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=i+1(1 − pi − pj )k
∼a
(
1 − pmin − p(2)min
1 − pmin
)k
as k → ∞,
where a is some constant and p(2)min is the second smallest probability among p1, . . . , pn. This fact implies that the pair
of (6) and (9) is expected to always give very close bounds in the tail of the ccdf of X.
Remark 14. Inequality (9) can also be generalized to the following (please see Appendix B):
P [X(p)> k]
2l−1∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
∑
J :|J |=j
(1 − PJ )k for l = 1, 2, . . . . (10)
Remark 15. By combining some upper and lower bounds of the ccdf of X, we can easily obtain its asymptotic decay
rate (see Appendix E)
lim
k→∞
1
k
logP [X>k] = log(1 − pmin), (11)
which means that X is a light-tailed random variable.
4. Application: efﬁciency evaluation of PPM schemes
In this section, we explain how the ccdf of the detecting cost is related to the attacking-path-detection efﬁciency of
PPM schemes, and show the results of some numerical experiments to conform the tightness of the bounds.
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4.1. Outline of the PPM scheme
Here, we consider a single-source DoS attack where there are n routers between the victim and the attacker (the
source of attack packets). We refer to the link between routers at distance i − 1 and i from the victim as link i. To
simplify the explanation, we assume that routers can mark packets with the full information of the link during packet
forwarding; that is, each packet is assumed to have two 32-bit ﬁelds in its IP header to store IP addresses of both end
routers of the link.
When a router decides to mark a packet, it writes its own IP address into one of the 32-bit ﬁelds, which we call
source ﬁeld. Then, the following router ﬁnds that the source ﬁled has been marked but another ﬁeld, which we call sink
ﬁeld, is not marked. If the following router decides not to mark the packet, then it writes its IP address into the sink
ﬁeld. Otherwise, the following router overwrites its own IP address into the source ﬁeld. The probability that a router
decides to mark a packet is p. The victim could know which link a packet traversed based on two IP addresses stored
in source and sink ﬁelds of the packet. We say that link i is detected when the victim ﬁrstly receives a packet marked
with the information on link i. We also say that the entire path is detected when all links in the entire path (besides the
link between the furthest router and the attacker) have been detected.
Let pi be the probability that the information about link i is marked in a packet received by the victim. Then, in the
above mentioned scheme, pi should be equal to p(1−p)i−1. In this section, we refer to a vector p def= (p1, p2, . . . , pn)
as marking probability vector. Note that the marking probability corresponds to the sampling probability in previous
sections. For later use, we deﬁne the following:
p(k : l) def=
⎛
⎝p1(l), . . . , p1(l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, p2(l), . . . , p2(l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, . . . , pn(l), . . . , pn(l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
⎞
⎠ ,
pi(l)
def= p(1 − p)i−1/l, i = 1, . . . , n.
Remark 16. The above mentioned scheme needs to use the option ﬁeld of IP header to store two IP addresses of both
end routers of the link. However, such an implementation is not practical because appending additional data to a packet
in ﬂight is expensive [8]. We here focus on such a scheme simply because it is easy to understand how our proposal
will be applied, and our proposal explained in Section 3 can also be applied to other (more practical) PPM schemes.
4.2. False negative ratio of a single-source attack
Now, deﬁne the false negative ratio Pfn(N) by the probability that the attack path is not detected by the time when
the victim receives N attack packets. It is obvious that the number of packets required for reconstructing the entire
attack path is equivalent to the detecting cost of the coupon collector problem when the marking probability vector is
p(1; 1), and thus we obtain
Pfn(N) = P [X(p(1; 1))>N]. (12)
4.3. False negative ratio of a multiple-source attack
A multiple-source attack can be evaluated based on the results of a single-source attack. To see this, consider a DoS
attack from L different attack paths. We assume that the numbers of routers on respective attack paths are all n, and the
sets of routers on separate attack paths are mutually disjoint.
Now, let Ldetect(N) denote the expectation of the number of attack paths that have been detected by the time when
the victim receives N attack packets, and deﬁne the false negative ratio by the following:
Pfn(N)
def= 1 − Ldetect(N)
L
.
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Table 1
The ccdf of X when p= p(1; 1)
k P [X>k]
Exact Lower bound (5) Upper bound (8) Lower bound (6) Upper bound (9)
50 9.991495 × 10−1 9.985956 × 10−1 9.999926 × 10−1 −6.849914 5.124129
100 7.976888 × 10−1 7.222236 × 10−1 9.736670 × 10−1 5.300224 × 10−1 1.445076
200 1.331392 × 10−1 6.777143 × 10−2 3.934783 × 10−1 1.328993 × 10−1 1.409456 × 10−1
300 1.607553 × 10−2 4.108340 × 10−3 7.330718 × 10−2 1.607524 × 10−2 1.617317 × 10−2
400 2.024288 × 10−3 2.428807 × 10−4 1.174271 × 10−2 2.024288 × 10−3 2.025706 × 10−3
500 2.672380 × 10−4 1.433926 × 10−5 1.837711 × 10−3 2.672380 × 10−4 2.672608 × 10−4
600 3.647972 × 10−5 8.465028 × 10−7 2.865897 × 10−4 3.647972 × 10−5 3.648011 × 10−5
700 5.099771 × 10−6 4.997217 × 10−8 4.466984 × 10−5 5.099771 × 10−6 5.099778 × 10−6
800 7.256417 × 10−7 2.950041 × 10−9 6.961993 × 10−6 7.256417 × 10−7 7.256418 × 10−7
900 1.046625 × 10−7 1.741517 × 10−10 1.085045 × 10−6 1.046625 × 10−7 1.046625 × 10−7
1000 1.525891 × 10−8 1.028081 × 10−11 1.691067 × 10−7 1.525891 × 10−8 1.525891 × 10−8
Now letX(i) denote the number of packets required for the ith attack path detection. SinceX(1), . . . , X(L) are identically
distributed, it follows that
Ldetect(N) =
L∑
i=1
E[I (X(i)N)] = LE[I (X(1)N)] = LP [X(1)N ],
where I (·) is the indicator function deﬁned by
I (A)
def=
{1 A is true,
0 A is false.
Since the marking probability vector of the ﬁrst attack path is equal to p(1;L), we ﬁnally have
Pfn(N) = P [X(1) >N ] = P [X(p(1;L))>N ]. (13)
Note that letting L = 1 in (13) yields (12).
Remark 17. In general PPM schemes, routersmark packets with one of fragments of the link information (IP addresses
of both end routers of the link) because the link information should be marked into a limited-space ﬁeld which is not
sufﬁcient for storing two IP addresses. If the link information is divided into K fragments in a PPM scheme, then the
false negative ratio of this scheme is given by
Pfn(N) = P [X(p(K;L))>N ].
4.4. Numerical results
We have conducted several numerical experiments to examine the tightness of the proposed bounds.We ﬁrst numer-
ically calculates the ccdf of X when the marking probability vector is given by
p = p(1; 1) def= (p, p(1 − p), . . . , p(1 − p)n−1),
when n = 20 and p = 0.04. These parameter values are typical to the PPM schemes [8]. The results are listed in
Table 1.
As the table indicates that the pair of (8) and (5) yields tight bounds for P [X>k] when k is small, while the pair of
(9) and (6) yields tight bounds when k is large. In particular, the pair of (9) and (6) are very close to the actual ccdf
when the ccdf is less than 0.01.
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Table 2
The ccdf of X when p= p(1; 100)
k P [X>k]
Exact Lower bound (5) Upper bound (8) Lower bound (6) Upper bound (9)
50 9.979163 × 10−1 9.966632 × 10−1 9.999617 × 10−1 −7.638817 5.216266
100 7.923407 × 10−1 7.185807 × 10−1 9.683892 × 10−1 4.543995 × 10−1 1.490598
200 1.387561 × 10−1 7.275840 × 10−2 3.989690 × 10−1 1.383740 × 10−1 1.482523 × 10−1
300 1.717047 × 10−2 4.618931 × 10−3 7.673282 × 10−2 1.716992 × 10−2 1.729888 × 10−2
400 2.200421 × 10−3 2.841777 × 10−4 1.255495 × 10−2 2.200420 × 10−3 2.202421 × 10−3
500 2.953292 × 10−4 1.745016 × 10−5 2.000318 × 10−3 2.953292 × 10−4 2.953636 × 10−4
600 4.098103 × 10−5 1.071414 × 10−6 3.173527 × 10−4 4.098103 × 10−5 4.098167 × 10−5
700 5.823821 × 10−6 6.578280 × 10−8 5.031454 × 10−5 5.823821 × 10−6 5.823833 × 10−6
800 8.423925 × 10−7 4.038936 × 10−9 7.976245 × 10−6 8.423925 × 10−7 8.423928 × 10−7
900 1.235172 × 10−7 2.479828 × 10−10 1.264434 × 10−6 1.235172 × 10−7 1.235172 × 10−7
1000 1.830677 × 10−8 1.522566 × 10−11 2.004438 × 10−7 1.830677 × 10−8 1.830677 × 10−8
Table 3
The ccdf of X when p= p(8; 1)
k P [X>k]
Lower bound (5) Upper bound (8) Lower bound (6) Upper bound (9)
500 1.000000 1.000000 −420.1996 30.19812
1000 9.938940 × 10−1 1.000000 −10.440447 6.529360
2000 1.376713 × 10−1 8.010895 × 10−1 3.203004 × 10−1 3.967066 × 10−1
3000 4.481859 × 10−3 1.472110 × 10−1 2.865208 × 10−2 2.905747 × 10−2
4000 1.364965 × 10−4 1.574028 × 10−2 2.333307 × 10−3 2.335898 × 10−3
5000 4.148643 × 10−6 1.581563 × 10−3 1.981216 × 10−4 1.981400 × 10−4
6000 1.260852 × 10−7 1.579232 × 10−4 1.740106 × 10−5 1.740121 × 10−5
7000 3.831966 × 10−9 1.575925 × 10−5 1.565741 × 10−6 1.565742 × 10−6
8000 1.164606 × 10−10 1.572528 × 10−6 1.434201 × 10−7 1.434201 × 10−7
9000 3.539455 × 10−12 1.569128 × 10−7 1.331738 × 10−8 1.331738 × 10−8
10000 1.075706 × 10−13 1.565735 × 10−8 1.249916 × 10−9 1.249916 × 10−9
Table 2 shows the results when the marking probability vector is given by
p = p(1; 100) def= (p/100, p(1 − p)/100, . . . , p(1 − p)n−1/100),
when n = 20 and p = 0.04. Note that the ccdf of X when the marking probability vector is p(1; 100) gives the false
negative ratio of the PPM scheme when there are one hundred attackers. The results are similar with those of Table 1.
Finally, we show the results in Table 3 when the marking probability vector is given by
p = p(8; 1) def=
⎛
⎝p, . . . , p︸ ︷︷ ︸
8
, p(1 − p), . . . , p(1 − p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
8
, . . . , p(1 − p)n−1, . . . , p(1 − p)n−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
8
⎞
⎠ ,
when n = 20 and p = 0.04. The ccdf of X with marking probability vector p(8; 1) gives the false negative ratio of
the PPM scheme when the link information is divided into eight fragments and a router marks a packet with one of
the fragments when the packet traverse there (see Remark 17). In this case, we cannot compute the ccdf of X exactly
because of the huge computational time and thus, in the table, we show only the upper and lower bounds. The table
indicates that, except for the case when k is small, the difference between upper bound (9) and lower bound (6) is very
small, which enables us to accurately evaluate the ccdf based on (9) and (6) without computing the exact formula of
the ccdf.
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Table 4
The ccdf of X when the sampling probability has the power-law-type distribution
k P [X>k]
Exact Lower bound (5) Upper bound (8) Lower bound (6) Upper bound (9)
50 9.654626 × 10−1 1.454898 × 10−10 9.999958 × 10−1 −5.892639 2.754208
100 6.122455 × 10−1 1.058365 × 10−21 9.910044 × 10−1 5.549317 × 10−1 8.766862 × 10−1
200 1.165242 × 10−1 5.600678 × 10−44 5.899394 × 10−1 1.163998 × 10−1 1.220404 × 10−1
300 1.984819 × 10−2 2.963779 × 10−66 1.667368 × 10−1 1.984780 × 10−2 1.998422 × 10−2
400 3.526034 × 10−3 1.568379 × 10−88 3.718076 × 10−2 3.526033 × 10−3 3.529853 × 10−3
500 6.515372 × 10−4 8.299586 × 10−111 7.864564 × 10−3 6.515372 × 10−4 6.516535 × 10−4
600 1.238222 × 10−4 4.391994 × 10−133 1.645123 × 10−3 1.238222 × 10−4 1.238259 × 10−4
700 2.400885 × 10−5 2.324165 × 10−155 3.433316 × 10−4 2.400885 × 10−5 2.400898 × 10−5
800 4.724491 × 10−6 1.229907 × 10−177 7.161753 × 10−5 4.724491 × 10−6 4.724496 × 10−6
900 9.401408 × 10−7 6.508450 × 10−200 1.493762 × 10−5 9.401408 × 10−7 9.401410 × 10−7
1000 1.887089 × 10−7 3.444157 × 10−222 3.115546 × 10−6 1.887089 × 10−7 1.887089 × 10−7
Remark 18. In the numerical examples explained above,we considered the case that the sampling probability (marking
probability) (p1, . . . , pn) has a geometric-type distribution. As explained in Remarks 8 and 13, the pair of (6) and (9)
are expected to give tight bounds even in more general cases. Table 4 shows the ccdf of Xwhen the sampling probability
has the following power-law-type distribution:
pi = ci−2, c = 1
/ 20∑
i=1
i−2, i = 1, . . . , 20.
Table 4 conﬁrms that the pair of (6) and (9) gives tight bounds even when the sampling probability has power-law-type
distribution, while the pair of (5) and (8) (in particular, (5)) fails to give tight bounds.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we derived upper and lower bounds of the ccdf of the detecting cost in the coupon collector problem.All
of the derived bounds requiremuch less computation comparedwith the exact formula. Through numerical experiments,
we found that proposed bounds are very close to the actual ccdf when sampling probability is set to the value common
to the PPM schemes for IP traceback problem. The derived bounds will be very helpful not only for evaluating the
efﬁciency of various PPM schemes, but also for a wide variety of applications of the coupon collector problem.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 5
To prove the lemma, we need the following result.
Lemma 19 (Marshall and Olkin [5]). A function f deﬁned on Rn is Schur-convex (concave) iff f is symmetric and
f (q, (1 − )q, p3, . . . , pn) is a non-decreasing (non-increasing) function of  for  ∈ (0, 1/2].
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To use this lemma, observe that
P [X(p)> k] =
n−2∑
i=0
(−1)i
∑
J ;|J |=I,1,2/∈J
(1 − p1 − PJ )k +
n−2∑
i=0
(−1)i
∑
J ;|J |=I,1,2/∈J
(1 − p2 − PJ )k
+
n−2∑
i=0
(−1)i+1
∑
J ;|J |=I,1,2/∈J
(1 − p1 − p2 − PJ )k + g(p3, . . . , pn),
where g(p3, . . . , pn) is some function of p3, . . . , pn. Now deﬁne
f ()
def= P [X(q, (1 − )q, p3, . . . , pn)> k].
Then
f () =
n−2∑
i=0
(−1)i
∑
J ;|J |=I,1,2/∈J
(1 − q − PJ )k +
n−2∑
i=0
(−1)i
∑
J ;|J |=I,1,2/∈J
(1 − (1 − )q − PJ )k
+
n−2∑
i=0
(−1)i
∑
J ;|J |=I,1,2/∈J
(1 − q − PJ )k + g(p3, . . . , pn),
from which
df
d
= −kq
n−2∑
i=0
(−1)i
∑
J ;|J |=I,1,2/∈J
{(1 − q − PJ )k−1 − (1 − (1 − )q − PJ )k−1}. (A.1)
Now let
h(a)
def=
n∑
i=0
(−1)i
∑
J ;|J |=i
(1 − a − PJ )k−1.
As shown in Appendix C, h(a) is a decreasing function of a. Combining this fact with (A.1) gives df/d0, which
proves the assertion.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 7
Deﬁne
R
(k)
i =
⋃
J :|J |=i
S
(k)
J
/ ⋃
J :|J |=i+1
S
(k)
J .
Note that R(k)i denote the event that i types of objects are not still detected by the time when k objects are sampled.
Since R(k)1 , . . . , R
(k)
n are mutually disjoint events, it follows that
P
⎡
⎣ n⋃
j=1
A
(k)
j
⎤
⎦= n∑
i=1
P [R(k)i ].
By a similar argument used for proving the inclusion–exclusion principle [2],
∑
J :|J |=m
P [S(k)J ] =
n∑
i=1
(
i
m
)
P [R(k)i ],
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from which we obtain
∑
J :|J |=1
P [S(k)J ] −
∑
J :|J |=2
P [S(k)J ] =
n∑
i=1
((
i
1
)
−
(
i
2
))
P [R(k)i ]
=
n∑
i=1
(
1 −
(
i − 1
2
))
P [R(k)i ]

n∑
i=1
P [R(k)i ].
Thus, the assertion follows by the observation that
P [X>k] = P
⎡
⎣ n⋃
j=1
A
(k)
j
⎤
⎦= n∑
i=1
P [R(k)i ]

∑
J :|J |=1
P [S(k)J ] −
∑
J :|J |=2
P [S(k)J ]
=
∑
J :|J |=1
(1 − PJ )k −
∑
J :|J |=2
(1 − PJ )k .
Note that, in general, the following relationship holds:
l∑
m=1
(−1)m+1
∑
J :|J |=m
P [S(k)J ] =
l∑
m=1
(−1)m+1
n∑
i=1
(
i
m
)
P [R(k)i ]
=
n∑
i=1
l∑
m=1
(−1)m+1
(
i
m
)
P [R(k)i ]
=
n∑
i=1
(
1 + (−1)l+1
(
i − 1
l
))
P [R(k)i ],
where we use the fact
l∑
m=1
(−1)m+1
(
i
m
)
=
l∑
m=1
(−1)m+1
{(
i − 1
m − 1
)
+
(
i − 1
m
)}
=
{
1 +
(
i − 1
1
)}
−
{(
i − 1
1
)
+
(
i − 1
2
)}
+ · · · + (−1)l+1
{(
i − 1
l − 1
)
+
(
i − 1
l
)}
= 1 + (−1)l+1
(
i − 1
l
)
.
Thus,
l∑
m=1
(−1)m+1
∑
J :|J |=m
P [S(k)J ]
{∑ni=1P [R(k)i ] l is odd,

∑n
i=1P [R(k)i ] l is even.
This observation yields
P [X>k] =
n∑
i=1
P [R(k)i ]
{∑lm=1(−1)m+1∑J :|J |=mP [S(k)J ] l is odd,

∑l
m=1(−1)m+1
∑
J :|J |=mP [S(k)J ] l is even,
which gives the proof of (5) and (10).
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Appendix C. Proof of Lemma 10
First note that there is no coordinate-wise ordering relationship between sampling probability vectors, the sums of
whose elements are respectively equal to 1. So, we can focus on the case where
∑n
i=1pi < 1. Since the ccdf of X(p)
is symmetric, to complete the proof it is sufﬁcient to prove that the ccdf of X(p) is a decreasing function of p1. To this
end, let f (p1) denote P [X(p)> k]. Observe that
f (p1) =
n−1∑
i=0
(−1)i
∑
J ;|J |=I,1/∈J
(1 − p1 − PJ )k + c, (C.1)
where c is some constant. In this case, using representation (C.1), we obtain
df
dp1
= − k
n−1∑
i=0
(−1)i
∑
J ;|J |=I,1/∈J
(1 − p1 − PJ )k−1
= − k
⎧⎨
⎩(1 − p1)k−1 −
n−1∑
i=1
(−1)i−1
∑
J ;|J |=I,1/∈J
(1 − p1 − PJ )k−1
⎫⎬
⎭
= − k
⎧⎨
⎩P [S(k−1)1 ] −
n∑
i=1
(−1)i−1
∑
J ;|J |=i,1/∈J
P [S(k−1)J ∩ S(k−1)1 ]
⎫⎬
⎭
= − k
{
P [S(k−1)1 ] − P
[
S
(k−1)
1 ∩
n⋃
i=2
A
(k−1)
j
]}
0,
which completes the proof.
Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 12
Observe that
P [X>k] = P
⎡
⎣ n⋃
j=1
A
(k)
j
⎤
⎦  n∑
j=1
P [A(k)j ] =
n∑
j=1
(1 − pj )k ,
which completes the proof.
Appendix E. Derivation of (11)
We ﬁrst assume that p1 = pmin and that p1 <pj for all j = 2, . . . , N . It follows from (9) that
lim sup
k→∞
1
k
logP [X>k] lim sup
k→∞
1
k
log
{
n∑
i=1
(1 − pi)k
}
= lim sup
k→∞
1
k
log
{
(1 − p1)k
n∑
i=1
(
1 − pi
1 − p1
)k}
= log(1 − p1) + lim sup
k→∞
1
k
log
{
n∑
i=1
(
1 − pi
1 − p1
)k}
= log(1 − p1). (E.1)
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Next observe that
P [X>k] = P
⎡
⎣ n⋃
j=1
A
(k)
j
⎤
⎦ P [A(k)1 ] = (1 − p1)k ,
Thus, we obtain
lim inf
k→∞
1
k
logP [X>k] lim inf
k→∞
1
k
log(1 − p1)k
= log(1 − p1). (E.2)
Combining (E.1) and (E.2) proves the assertion. The similar arguments give the proof for the case that some j ∈
(2, . . . , N) satisﬁes p1 = pj .
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